By the early 1990s
Libya's support of international terrorism, and in particular the 1988 bombing
of a U.S. airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, had prompted the imposition of UN
economic sanctions. These sanctions restricted Libya's foreign trade, and presumably
restricted the funds available to the Libyan nuclear program. Nevertheless, in
the early 1990s, reports indicate that Libya tried to exploit the chaos
generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to former Soviet
nuclear technology, expertise, and materials. In 1992, for example, an official
of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, one of Russia's leading nuclear research
centers, claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to recruit two of his
colleagues to work at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center in Libya.[23] Other
reports also suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work on a
covert Libyan nuclear weapons program.
Throughout the 1990s, Qadhafi renewed calls for the
production of nuclear weapons in Libya[24] and pursued new avenues for nuclear
technology procurement,[25] while publicly, if grudgingly, supporting the
nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference, Libya initially rejected an indefinite extension because Israel had
never joined the treaty; however, Libya eventually supported the extension. In
1996, Qadhafi stated that Arab states should develop a nuclear weapon to
counter Israel's presumed nuclear weapons capability. Nonetheless, in April
1996 Libya signed theAfrican-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Later that same
year, Libya voted against the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at the UN
General Assembly because it did not provide a deadline for nuclear disarmament.
(Libya eventually signed the CTBT in November 2001 and ratified it in January
2004.)[26]
According to the IAEA Director General's February 2004
report, "[i]n July 1995, Libya made a strategic decision to reinvigorate
its nuclear activities," including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. In
1997, foreign manufacturers, including Pakistan, provided 20 pre-assembled L-1
centrifuges and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges and related
parts. [27] One of the 20 pre-assembled rotors was used to install a completed
single centrifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was first successfully tested in
October 2000. Libya reported to the IAEA that no nuclear material had been used
during tests on the L-1 centrifuges.[28]
In 1997, Libya began receiving nuclear weapons-related aid
from Dr. A.Q. Khan, the chief architect of the Pakistani nuclear weapons
program and confessed proliferator of nuclear technologies to several countries
of concern, including Iran and North Korea. This cooperation continued until
fall 2003, when Khan's clandestine collaboration with these countries became
public following Libya's disclosures about its efforts to build nuclear
weapons. In 1997, Khan supplied Libya with the 20 assembled L-1 centrifuges,
[29] and components for an additional 200 more intended for a pilot facility.
In 2001, Libya received almost two tons of UF6; while some reports claim that
the UF6 was provided by Pakistan,[30] others cite evidence that it originated
in North Korea.[31] IAEA sources believe that amount of UF6 is consistent with
the requirements for a pilot enrichment facility. If enriched, the UF6 could
produce a single nuclear weapon.[32]In late 1997, Libya also renewed its
nuclear cooperation with Russia, and in March 1998 Libya signed a contract with
the Russian company Atomenergoeksport for a partial overhaul of the Tajoura
Nuclear Research Center.[33]
In late 2000, Libya's nuclear activities accelerated. Libyan
authorities have informed the IAEA that at that time, Libya began to order
centrifuges and components from other countries with the intention of installing
a centrifuge plant to make enriched uranium. Libya also imported equipment for
a fairly large precision machine shop (located at Janzour) and acquired a large
stock of maraging steel and high strength aluminum alloy to build a domestic
centrifuge production capability.[34] In September 2000, Libya received two L-2
centrifuges (European-designed centrifuges more advanced than the L-1). In late
2000, Libya began to progressively install 9-machine, 19-machine, and
64-machine L-1 centrifuge cascades into a large hall at Al Hashan.[35] Only the
9-centrifuge machine was completely assembled in 2002.[36] Libya also ordered
10,000 L-2 centrifuges from Pakistan. By late December 2002, component parts
for the centrifuges began arriving in Libya.[37] However, in October 2003, U.S.
intelligence agencies seized a subsequent consignment of centrifuge-related
equipment bound for Libya in a northern Mediterranean port.[38] Investigations
revealed that many of these components were manufactured by the Scomi Precision
Engineering SDN BHD plant in Malaysia with "roles played by foreign
technical, manufacturing, and transshipment experts, including A.Q. Khan and
his associates at A.Q. Khan Laboratories in Pakistan, B.S.A. Tahgir in Malaysia
and Dubai, and several Swiss, British, and German nationals."[39]
Libya sought not only the capability to enrich uranium to
weapon-grade levels, but also the know-how to design and fabricate nuclear
weapons.[40] In either late 2001 or early 2002, A.Q. Khan provided Libya with
the blueprint for a fission weapon.[41] According to the February 2004 IAEA
report, Libya acknowledged receiving from a foreign source in late 2001 or
early 2002, documentation related to nuclear weapon design and fabrication.
"The documents presented by Libya include a series of engineering drawings
relating to nuclear weapons components, notes, (many of them handwritten)
related to the fabrication of weapon components. The notes indicate the
involvement of other parties and will require follow-up."[42] U.S. intelligence
analysts believe the documents included a nuclear weapon design that China
tested in the late 1960s and allegedly later shared with Pakistan. Reportedly,
the design documents produced by Libya were transferred from Pakistan,
contained information in both Chinese and English and set forth the design
parameters and engineering specifications for constructing an implosion weapon
weighing over 1,000 pounds that could be delivered using an aircraft or a large
ballistic missile.[43] Libya ultimately told IAEA investigators that it had no
national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and would
have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear
weapon.[44]
Late 2003 to 2008: Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons
At the same time that
Libya pursued centrifuge technology and nuclear weapons designs, Qadhafi began
to make overtures to the West in the hopes of having economic and other
sanctions lifted. Reportedly, Libya had established secret communications
regarding terrorist activities and WMD with the United States as early as
1999.[45] According to some analysts, the 11 September 2001 attacks, which
Qadhafi denounced, and the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq increased Libya's
desire to make peace with the United States.[46] In March 2003, days before the
invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi's personal envoys contacted President Bush and
British Prime Minister Tony Blair about Libya's willingness to dismantle all
WMD programs. Subsequently, at Qadhafi's direction, Libyan officials provided
British and U.S. officers with documentation and additional details on Libya's
chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile activities.[47] In August
2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the 1988 bombing of a U.S. commercial
airliner, Pan Am 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, and agreed to pay millions of
dollars to each of the victims' families. In response, the UN Security Council
voted to end international sanctions, but the Bush administration abstained,
saying that Libya still had to answer questions about its WMD programs and
meddling in African conflicts.[48]
Despite its ongoing negotiations with the West, Libya
continued to procure nuclear technologies from other countries. In October
2003, British and U.S. ships operating pursuant to the U.S.-led Proliferation
Security Initiative intercepted a German cargo ship heading to Libya from Dubai
with a cargo of centrifuge parts allegedly based on Pakistani designs.[49]
Following the seizure of the ship, Libya reportedly allowed U.S. and British
officials to visit 10 previously secret sites and dozens of Libyan laboratories
and military factories to search for evidence of nuclear fuel cycle-related
activities, and for chemical and missile programs. Finally, on 19 December 2003
Qadhafi announced his commitment to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in
his country. In a letter to the UN Security Council, Libya reaffirmed its
commitment to the NPT, agreed to abide by the Additional Protocol to the IAEA
Safeguards Agreement (allowing for additional and more intrusive inspections of
nuclear-related sites), and agreed to receive inspections teams to verify its
new commitments.[50] President Bush stated that with Qadhafi's announcement,
"Libya has begun the process of rejoining the community of nations."[51]
One news source quotes Qadhafi as claiming that his decision to forego WMD
programs was based on national security and economic interests. In an address
to the Libyan People's National Congress, Qadhafi reportedly said, "Today
it becomes a problem to have a nuclear bomb. At the time, it was maybe the
fashion to have a nuclear bomb. Today, you have no enemy. Who's the
enemy?"[52]
Several factors probably contributed to Libya's decision to
renounce its nuclear program. First, 30 years of economic sanctions
significantly limited oil exports and hurt the Libyan economy. Second, Libya's
nuclear program progressed fairly slowly and at a great cost to the country,
both economically and politically. [53] Third, the elimination of WMD was a
prerequisite to normalizing relations with the West, and ending Libya's pariah
status reportedly had become particularly important to Qadhafi. Fourth,
according to some U.S. officials, Libya wanted to avoid Iraq's fate. [54]
Finally, the October 2003 seizure of the ship with centrifuge-related cargo and
ensuing investigations may have persuaded Libya that it would have difficulty
with future WMD procurement efforts.[55]
Following the December 2003 announcement, a Libyan
delegation informed the IAEA Director General that "Libya had been engaged
for more than a decade in the development of a uranium enrichment
capability."[56] Libya admitted to importing natural uranium, centrifuge
and conversion equipment, and nuclear weapons design documents. However, Libyan
officials said that the enrichment program was at an early stage of
development, that no industrial scale facilities had been built, and that Libya
lacked the technical know-how to interpret the weapons design documents. Libya
acknowledged that some of these activities put it in violation of its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement. With Libya's consent, in December 2003 and January 2004
the IAEA Director General and Agency teams made several visits to 18 locations
related to possible nuclear weapons-related activities and began the process of
verifying Libya's previously undeclared nuclear materials, equipment,
facilities, and activities. The Agency concluded that "initial inspections
of these locations did not identify specific facilities currently dedicated to
nuclear weapon component manufacturing."[57] However, it also noted that
further analytical and field activities would be necessary to determine how far
Libya had progressed in weapons design activities.
Pursuant to understandings with the United Kingdom and the
United States, Libya agreed to transfer to the United States "sensitive
design information, nuclear weapon related documents, and most of the
previously undeclared enrichment equipment, subject to Agency verification
requirements and procedures."[58] On 22 January 2004, Libya's nuclear
weapons design information, including the Chinese blueprint purchased from
Pakistan, was sent to the United States, and on 26 January, U.S. transport
planes carried 55,000 pounds of documents and equipment related to Libya's
nuclear and ballistic missile programs to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee. The nuclear portion of this shipment "included several
containers of uranium hexafluoride (used as feedstock for enrichment); 2 P-2
[L-2] centrifuges from Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories and additional
centrifuge parts, equipment, and documentation."[59] In March 2004, over
1,000 additional centrifuge and missile parts were shipped out of Libya.[60]
IAEA inspectors tagged and sealed most of the equipment sent to the United
States, and assisted with its evaluation.
At the same time, Libya took steps to improve its
participation in international nonproliferation regimes. Libya ratified the
CTBT in January 2004, and 0n 18 February 2004, Libya gave the IAEA written
confirmation of its intention to conclude an Additional Protocol with the
Agency and to act as if the protocol had entered into force on 29 December
2003.[61]
On 8 March 2004, Russia, the United States, and the IAEA
removed 16 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from Libya's Tajoura
Nuclear Research Center; the HEU fuel was airlifted by a Russian company to
Dimitrovgrad, where it would be down-blended into low-enriched uranium fuel.
The United States would ultimately complete conversion of the Tajoura Soviet-supplied
IRT-1 research reactor to the use of low enriched uranium fuel in October 2006.
[62]
On 20 February 2004, the IAEA Director General issued a
report on the implementation of Libya's IAEA Safeguards Agreement. [63] The
report found that, "Starting in the early 1980s and continuing until the
end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear material and conducted a wide variety of
nuclear activities, which it had failed to report to the Agency as required
under its Safeguards Agreement."[64] Such violations included failure to
declare the import and storage of UF6 and other uranium compounds; failure to
declare the fabrication and irradiation of uranium targets, and their
subsequent processing, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium;
and failure to provide design information for the pilot centrifuge facility,
uranium conversion facility, and hot cells associated with the research
reactor. The report also touched on support from foreign sources to Libya's
program, noting that, "As part of verifying the correctness and
completeness of Libya's declarations, the Agency is also investigating...the
supply routes and sources of sensitive nuclear technology and related equipment
and nuclear and non-nuclear materials. ...it is evident already that a network
has existed whereby actual technological know-how originates from one source,
while the delivery of equipment and some of the materials have taken place
through intermediaries, who have played a coordinating role, subcontracting the
manufacturing to entities in yet other countries."[65]
On 10 March 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a
resolution commending Libya for its cooperation with the Agency, but noting
with concern the breach of its Safeguards Agreement and its acquisition of
nuclear weapons designs. [66] As a result of Libya's cooperation with the IAEA,
on 23 April 2005 President Bush lifted most of the remaining restrictions on
doing business with Libya, although he did not remove Libya from the State
Department's list of nations that support terrorism. For the first time in
decades, the United States would have a diplomatic mission in Tripoli and U.S.
oil companies, barred from Libya for 18 years, would have an opportunity to
help develop Libya's rich oil fields. President Bush suggested that Colonel
Qadhafi was beginning to meet his goal of acceptance by the international
community and that his actions might serve as a model for North Korea and Iran:
"Through its actions, Libya has set a standard that we hope other nations
will emulate in rejecting weapons of mass destruction and in working
constructively with international organizations to halt the proliferation of
the world's most dangerous systems."[67]
Recent Developments and Current Status
In September 2008, then IAEA Director General Mohamed
El-Baradei announced that due to its "cooperation and transparency"
during the Agency's investigation, Libya would only be subject to routine IAEA
inspections.[68] The conclusion of the IAEA investigation has since enabled
Libya to strengthen foreign diplomatic relations and engage in bilateral
agreements facilitating cooperation on nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes.
Libya has continued to take steps toward establishing a
nuclear power infrastructure. In addition to a 2007 agreement with France,
Libya has also completed nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina,
Ukraine, and Russia, and concluded a memorandum of understanding with
Canada.[69] These agreements vary in the amount and type of cooperation
offered. The Russian agreement is the most comprehensive, including offers to
design and construct a power reactor, supply reactor fuel, and provide
technology related to medical isotopes and nuclear waste disposal.[70] The
United States continues to review whether it will be willing to cooperate with
Libya on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.[71] However, due to the Libyan
Civil War of 2011 and the ensuing political chaos it appears very unlikely that
Libya will move ahead with the establishment of a civilian nuclear energy
program in the foreseeable future. In August 2011, Qadhafi’s government was
ousted when rebel forces captured the capital Tripoli in the final stages of
the war. Qadhafi’s death in October 2011 marked the formal end of the conflict.
As of November 2011, the political situation in post-Qadhafi Libya remains
unpredictable and highly volatile. For instance, it is uncertain if Libya’s
future political institutions will be modeled roughly after Western-style
representative democracy, or dictated by Islamic Sharia law. Consequently, it
is doubtful if foreign suppliers would feel obliged to honor nuclear
cooperation agreements they signed with the Qadhafi government.
